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Housing autonomy of youth 
in Europe: do labour and housing 
policies matter?
Valentina Goglio and Sonia Bertolini
Introduction
Leaving one’s home of origin is regarded as one of the key markers 
of the transition to adulthood (Shanahan, 2000; Corijn and Klijzing, 
2001). Indeed, the individual life courses of youth are socially 
embedded in the macroinstitutional and structural as well as cultural 
context that defines the set of opportunities and constraints to which 
individual persons respond when making their life course decisions 
and transitions.
The factors that influence the means and timing of young people’s 
housing autonomy in different institutional contexts are complex and 
interwoven. They include historical differences, social and cultural 
norms, institutional frameworks, and macrolevel economic factors such 
as the structure of labour markets and access to housing (Buchmann 
and Kriesi, 2011; Breen and Buchmann, 2016; Bertolini et al, 2019).
On the macrolevel, following Moreno (2012), comparative European 
research has shown the combined influence of the welfare regime on 
what some authors refer to as the transition regime (Walther, 2006), and 
of culture (Billari and Liefbroer, 2007; Giuliano, 2007; Goldscheider 
and Goldscheider, 1989, 1996; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004) on 
the diverse trends observed in the transition to adulthood in various 
European countries.
Macrolevel factors and labour market integration are not the only 
determinants of such a complex phenomenon as leaving one’s home 
of origin and setting up one’s own household. Indeed, there is a 
wide body of literature highlighting the role of other micro- and 
mesolevel determinants. Young people’s opportunities and transition 
to adulthood are strongly influenced by the individual’s original 




Housing autonomy of youth in Europe
167
specific mechanisms of transition for different social classes (Bernardi 
and Poggio, 2004; Barbera et al, 2010). Gender is another important 
determinant: in certain contexts, employment and the level of earnings 
may be more important for men who are expected to be breadwinners, 
and somewhat less important for women who may rely on their 
partners’ income (Aassve et al, 2001). The combination of gender and 
social class has also shown how British working- class women left the 
parental home for reasons that were different from those of men; and 
in the United States, how young women of Southern European and 
Hispanic origin lowered their nest- leaving expectations (Goldscheider 
and Goldscheider, 1989). Moreover, the general process of expansion 
in education in recent decades (Schofer and Meyer, 2005) has had 
the effect of postponing entry into the labour market and subsequent 
stabilisation (Mortimer et al, 2005).
However, this chapter will focus on one of the main determinants 
of the decision to leave the parental home: the level of individual 
economic resources directly available to young adults (Ermisch, 1999; 
McElroy, 1985). In this respect, the situation in the labour market and 
the consequent availability of economic resources coming from the job 
are important in structuring the decision to leave the parental home 
(Blossfeld, 1995; Galland, 2001; Heinz, 2001; Mayer, 1997; Scherer, 
2004; Schizzerotto, 2002). If young people experience difficulties 
in labour market integration and perceive their situation as unstable 
and insecure, they may be relatively less willing to make such a step 
(Aassve et al, 2001). There is a large body of evidence confirming the 
importance of employment and the level of earnings for opportunities 
to leave the parental home and for feeling autonomous among youth 
(Aassve et al, 2001; Buck and Scott, 1993; Iacovou, 2010; Mulder 
et al, 2002; Mulder and Clark, 2000; Nilsson and Strandh, 1999; 
Vitali, 2010).
According to these studies, having a job is a prerequisite for 
establishing one’s own household especially among individuals who, 
for various reasons, cannot expect to receive financial support from 
family members (Jacob and Kleinert, 2008; Vitali, 2010). Exit from 
the parental home reduces opportunities to receive material and 
emotional support from the family of origin. This makes the negative 
consequences associated with the risk of losing employment much 
stronger for those who decide to establish their own home (Aassve 
et al, 2007; Parisi, 2008). Unemployed or inactive youth may have 
very limited opportunities to leave the parental home due to their lack 
of economic resources. But opportunities for housing independence 
vary widely, including among those young people who actually are 
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involved in paid work. In particular, the attention of researchers has 
recently turned towards the role of stability of employment (Fernandes 
et al, 2008; Becker et al, 2010; Barbieri et al, 2014). Labour market 
positions with high degrees of economic uncertainty prevent youth 
from making blind long- term commitments (Oppenheimer et al, 
1997; Mills and Blossfeld, 2003). Thus, irrespective of the level of 
income received by young adults, the expected variation in income 
may deter them from investing in household formation (Fernandes 
et al, 2008). Another important factor in this respect is that temporary 
jobs produce wage discounts, namely lower levels of income (due to 
lower bargaining power) and ‘wage scars’ through the employment 
history of individuals employed in temporary positions (for example, 
due to limited promotion opportunities) (Gebel, 2009). Yet, the role of 
employment and earnings varies across countries depending not only 
on the structure of the labour market and on the educational system 
(which may smooth the school- to- work transition) but also on the 
different welfare state regimes.
Previous studies have shown whether and to what degree labour 
market vulnerability affects decisions about leaving the parental 
home and forming a family; and they have indicated how this differs 
across countries and across different welfare state regimes (Aassve 
et al, 2002; Blossfeld et al, 2005; Müller and Gangl, 2003). Specific 
institutional configurations of the labour market and welfare state, 
as well as macrostructural conditions, are relevant explanations for 
country differences and for their impact on unemployed young people’s 
decisions to leave home.
Country- specific institutional arrangements produce distinctive 
national responses to the global social processes (labour market 
flexibilisation and privatisation of social security), and different 
institutional settings are linked to different patterns of exposure 
to social risks (Bonoli, 2004; Rovny, 2014; Taylor- Gooby, 2004). 
Thus, for the purposes of this work, the focus is on institutional 
determinants, because national institutional backgrounds, and 
policies in particular, are expected to have a mediating effect on how 
young people’s risks of labour market exclusion and job insecurity 
translate into risks of social exclusion (Mills and Blossfeld, 2003). 
In general, in countries that provide more generous support for 
youth, the impact of labour market weakness on housing autonomy 
is reduced. Nonetheless, it remains unclear what dimensions of 
the institutional setting may be most important when it comes to 
buffering labour market insecurity and fostering individual autonomy 
among young people.
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Against this background, the intention is to study how macrolevel 
indicators can moderate the relationship between the individual labour 
market position and youth housing autonomy. In particular, the study 
focuses on labour market exclusion. This concept depicts a broad 
condition in which individuals are not integrated into the productive 
system, and this entails both the conditions of involuntary exclusion 
such as unemployment and voluntary conditions such as inactivity or 
being a student. This work narrows down the focus to the condition 
of unemployment alone (versus a situation of employment) but does 
not disaggregate the relationship between employment and housing 
autonomy further by distinguishing between permanent and temporary 
workers. This is because, although an important microlevel factor in the 
transition to housing autonomy, previous research using cross- sectional 
data has shown that the association between temporary employment 
and housing autonomy is weak and not significant for most EU28 
countries (Baranowska- Rataj et al, 2016).
Youth autonomy has multiple definitions in the social sciences. Most 
of these are linked to the notion of becoming an adult in different 
aspects of life (Cicchelli, 2013). For instance, it involves the capacity 
to take steps towards independence from the parental household, the 
ability to create one’s own universe, and the ability to govern one’s 
own life through relevant choices. Housing autonomy, the condition 
in which young people live outside of the parental home, is a crucial 
step enabling other stages of the individual’s life course. For this 
reason, the present chapter narrows the focus to housing autonomy 
alone. As far as macrolevel indicators are concerned, the focus is on 
two key macroindicators: employment protection legislation (EPL) 
and the amount of public investment in housing policies in the EU28 
member states.
Indeed, a high level of employment protection can guarantee 
continuity of jobs and thus of income. However, for those who 
are excluded from the labour market, a high level of employment 
protection translates into increased difficulties of integration into the 
labour market. In the last few decades, many European countries 
partially deregulated the labour market by decreasing the restrictions on 
temporary work, often targeting this at young people (Baranowska and 
Gebel, 2010). However, doubts about the effectiveness of these reforms 
soon arose (Kahn, 2010; Noelke, 2016). As Gebel and Giesecke (2016) 
have shown, deregulating the use of temporary contracts increased 
the risk of temporary employment for young people, but did not 
reduce their risk of unemployment: for young men with a low level 
of education; it even increased it.
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On the other hand, monetary transfers to support the costs of 
housing or policies that reduce the cost of housing itself decrease the 
economic burden of autonomous living that the individual has to 
bear. In particular, cash subsidies supporting rent have a positive effect 
on young adults’ housing autonomy, especially for those with lower 
incomes who are exposed to income instability. Therefore, a lower 
cost of living can reduce the negative effect of the loss of income 
associated with job loss.
There is abundant literature on the direct effect of EPL on labour 
market opportunities for young people; however, the moderating 
role of this particular macrolevel factor on the relationship between 
the labour market and housing has yet to be investigated. Similarly, 
despite the growing literature on the problem of the affordability of 
homes on a family budget (particularly in the case of young people), 
there is a lack of studies that investigate the moderating role of state 
investment in housing policies.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section frames the 
analyses in the existing literature, highlighting this study’s innovative 
perspective. The following section describes the research design 
including the hypotheses, the data, and the method of analysis. This is 
followed by the research findings and some concluding observations.
Theoretical background
Countries differ significantly in the extent to which they provide 
security with respect to potential job loss and unemployment (Ebralidze, 
2011; Gallie, 2007). Specific institutional configurations of the labour 
market and welfare state, as well as macrostructural conditions, are 
relevant explanations for differences between countries and the impact 
they have on the decision to leave home for unemployed young people.
Regulation and social policies are expected to filter the impact of 
increasing labour market exclusion and job insecurity for young people 
in different ways (Blossfeld et al, 2012; Mills and Blossfeld, 2003), and 
this can impact on their decisions about leaving their parental home 
(Bertolini, 2021a, 2021b, 2018).
This chapter uses a two- step multilevel model (Bryan and Jenkins, 
2013) to analyse the moderating role of EPL and of housing policies 
on the relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy 
of youth. It, formulates two main hypotheses. The first predicts that 
a high level of EPL for permanent contracts will negatively moderate 
the relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy. This 
is because a high level of regulation decreases the risk of losing a job 
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for those already employed (insiders); but, on the other hand, it may 
make it difficult for the unemployed (outsiders) to get into employment 
because employers tend not to hire outsiders when the costs of firing 
employees is high (Baranowska and Gebel, 2010).
The same hypothesis is used to test the moderating role of 
high EPL for temporary contracts on the relationship between 
unemployment and housing autonomy. The role of stricter regulation 
of temporary contracts, in particular restrictions on renewals, may be 
ambiguous: indeed, depending on the context, it may increase the 
chances of temporary workers ending up in unemployment (dead end) 
in labour markets with low mobility and in a situation of economic 
crisis, or ending up in permanent contracts (stepping stone effect) 
in efficient labour markets and a favourable economic situation. 
Because the time period covered by the analyses was characterised 
by unfavourable economic conditions, it is hypothesised that high 
EPL will have a negative moderating role on temporary contracts. 
Hence, stricter regulation of temporary contracts will make it harder 
for unemployed young people to get new jobs, even temporary ones, 
and thus harder for them to bear the costs of independent living due 
to lack of income.
The second hypothesis assumes that generous policies supporting the 
costs of independent living directly (with cash subsidies) or indirectly 
(with social housing policies) will positively moderate the association 
between unemployment and housing autonomy, thus reducing the 
negative effect of unemployment. This is because generous policies on 
housing help the individual to manage the costs of living autonomously 
even in the case of job loss. This lowers the pressure of housing costs 
for unemployed people who face reduced financial resources due to 
lack of employment income.
Because this chapter aims to address the role of the institutional 
setting and policies in association with labour market disadvantage and 
leaving the parental home, understanding the way labour protection is 
regulated is a good example of whether and how institutional regulation 
may play a role in moderating the relationship between individual 
labour market position and housing autonomy.
Indeed, many European countries have partially deregulated their 
labour markets by decreasing the restrictions on temporary work, 
and this is often targeted at youth (Baranowska and Gebel, 2010). 
However, doubts have been cast on the effectiveness of these reforms 
(Kahn, 2010; Noelke, 2016). As Gebel and Giesecke demonstrated 
(2016), deregulating the use of temporary contracts increased the risk of 
temporary employment for young people, but did not reduce the risk 
Social Exclusion of Youth in Europe
172
of unemployment. High levels of EPL regulation may make it difficult 
for temporary workers to get a permanent job, increasing the fear of 
subsequent unemployment. In addition, high levels of employment 
protection will increase temporary employment rates, because it will 
be more efficient for employers to hire temporary staff whose contracts 
expire after a certain date, thus avoiding potential firing costs. This has 
the potential to change the profile of people in employment toward a 
greater number of temporary employees who are less likely to be able 
to achieve housing autonomy (Baranowska and Gebel, 2010).
As far as the level of regulation for temporary contracts is concerned, 
empirical evidence has contested the theoretical assumption that a low 
level of regulation of temporary contracts would be associated with 
a higher rate of temporary employment (Nunziata and Staffolani, 
2007 in Baranowska and Gebel, 2010). Although loose regulation of 
temporary employment may appear to provide further incentive for 
employers to lower the potential cost of ending contracts that already 
contain a defined end date, empirical research has shown that there is 
no association between EPL and the incidence of temporary contracts 
(Booth et al, 2002 in Baranowska and Gebel, 2010).
When investigating the role of institutional factors in the relationship 
between labour market conditions and housing autonomy, one 
significant indicator is the level of expenditure specifically identified 
by states to help citizens with the costs of housing. Indeed, monetary 
transfer to support the cost of housing or policies that reduce the 
cost of housing, reduce the economic burden on individuals of living 
autonomously. In particular, cash subsidies to support rent have a 
positive effect on housing autonomy for young adults, especially those 
on lower incomes who are exposed to income instability. Indeed, 
generous public spending on housing may lower the cost of living, and 
this is particularly relevant for unemployed people who, compared to 
their employed peers, experience lack of income. If affordable housing 
is provided and/ or costs associated with renting are subsidised, even 
unemployed people can meet the cost of housing, which results at the 
macrolevel in a reduction of the negative effect of unemployment on 
the chances of living autonomously.
Based on the literature presented in this section, two main 
hypotheses are formulated for this study regarding the moderating 
effect of institutional factors on the relationship between labour market 
exclusion and housing autonomy.
Hypothesis 1: Employment protection legislation will play a 
moderating role in the relationship between unemployment 
and housing autonomy. A high level of EPL for permanent contracts 
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(EPL regular) will negatively moderate the relationship between 
unemployment and housing autonomy, in other words it will increase 
the negative effect of unemployment. A high level of EPL for temporary 
contracts (EPL temporary) is also expected to negatively moderate the 
relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy.
Hypothesis 2: Public policies supporting housing will play a 
moderating role in the relationship between unemployment 
and housing autonomy. Generous policies supporting housing 
autonomy either directly (through cash subsidies) or indirectly (through 
social housing policies) can positively moderate the association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy – that is, reduce the negative 
effect of unemployment.
Data and methods
The multilevel analyses presented here are based on individual cross- 
sectional data from the European Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU- SILC) survey for the year 2014. The database contains 
individual- level observations for 28 European countries that qualify the 
data as multilevel, with individuals at level one nested in countries at 
level two. The sample used for the individual- level regressions is made 
up of individuals aged 16 to 29 years who are employed or unemployed 
(inactives and students excluded).
The dependent variable, housing autonomy, refers to the residential 
circumstances of the individual: an individual is considered as having 
housing autonomy when she or he lives in a household not including 
her or his parents (variable equal to 1 if parents are not members of 
the household, equal to 0 otherwise).
The main independent variable is labour market exclusion, 
operationalised as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the self- 
reported economic status of the respondent is unemployed, equal to 
0 if employed.
The logistic regressions also include a set of control variables such as 
age, gender, immigrant status, level of education, and area of residence 
(urban or rural). Finally, housing autonomy is strongly associated with 
the presence of a partner (Holdsworth and Morgan, 2005; Iacovou, 
2010; Ruspini, 2015), because living with a partner may work as the 
main driver of the decision to live independently and may also work as 
a buffer in the case of labour market exclusion. As a result, the presence 
of a partner in the household is introduced as a further control.1
The macrolevel indicators used in the second- level regression are 
collected from official sources such as Eurostat and OECD. The 
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Employment Protection Legislation Index elaborated by OECD is 
used to test the moderating role of EPL separately for permanent and 
temporary contracts.
The moderating role of housing policies is tested with data on the 
amount of public expenditure on rent benefits (as a percentage of 
GDP) combined with the amount of general public expenditure on 
housing support (as a percentage of GDP) and public expenditure on 
housing and social exclusion recorded by Eurostat. All these measures 
indicate intervention by public authorities to help households meet the 
cost of housing, despite variations in implementation at the individual 
country level. The first measure refers to transfers granted by a public 
authority to tenants in order to help them with the costs of housing. 
The provision of the benefit is guaranteed for a limited period of time 
and access is conditional on meeting a qualifying criterion (means test) 
(Eurostat Glossary, 2018). The other two measures are part of the social 
protection framework that encompasses all interventions from public 
or private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the 
burden of a defined set of risks or needs (Eurostat Glossary, 2018) – 
in this case, housing risk, when housing and social exclusion are not 
classified elsewhere. For example, expenditure for housing benefits may 
refer to housing tenure in which the property is owned by a government 
authority and social housing benefit is given based on qualifying criteria 
based on income and employment. It may also refer to expenditure 
for housing and social exclusion not classified elsewhere. This refers 
to means- tested public schemes that also entitle individuals at risk of 
social exclusion, but are a residual category of need that differs from 
the other schemes (for example, old age, unemployment, disability). 
The macrolevel variables are summarised in Table 7.1.
As for the method, the study applies multilevel analyses using a two- 
step approach. As recently highlighted in the literature (Bryan and 
Jenkins, 2013, 2016), this method turns out to be particularly useful 
when the researcher has a dataset characterised by a relatively small 
number of macrolevel units but a relatively high number of observations 
within each group (countries).
The first step consists in estimating separate individual- level 
regressions between the dependent and independent variable for each 
country. Such a coefficient becomes the dependent variable in the 
second step which entails the estimation of the effect of the macrolevel 
variable (independent) on the coefficient of the individual- level 
relationship (dependent variable) through a linear regression model. 
The process requires an additional adjustment for standard errors that, 
in the case of the estimated dependent variable, tend to be biased and 
Housing autonomy of youth in Europe
175
estimated inconsistently due to the heteroscedasticity of the first- level 
sampling error in which variance differs across observations (Jusko, 
2005; Lewis and Linzer, 2005).
In this case the country- level logistic regressions are estimated first 
with being residentially autonomous (not living with parents) as the 
dependent variable and the proxy for labour market exclusion (being 
unemployed) as the independent variable with controls included. 
Then, the average marginal effects are estimated that, in the second 
step, turn into the dependent variable of a linear regression model 
in which the independent variable is the macrolevel indicator of 
interest (public expenditure on rent benefits as a percentage of GDP). 
Finally, standard errors of this second regression are corrected in 
order to take into consideration the uncertainty coming from using 
an estimated dependent variable. The error term of the second step 
regression includes a first component due to the individual- level 
regression (heteroscedasticity due to variance in the sampling error 
across countries) and a second component that is the country- level 
error term. Thus, standard errors of the second step linear regression 
model are corrected by adding a weight that is computed as in Huber 
(2005) and Baranowska and Gebel (2008).
Results
This section presents the results emerging from the two- step multilevel 
regression for the moderating role of selected macrolevel factors on the 
association between labour market exclusion and housing autonomy.
Table 7.1: List of macrolevel indicators
Macrolevel indicator Source
Employment protection legislation index Indicators of Employment Protection, 
OECD (https:// www.oecd.org/ 
employment/ emp/ oecdindicatorsofe
mploymentprotection.htm)
– Strictness of employment protection 
(regular contracts)
– Strictness of employment protection 
(temporary employment)
Social protection benefits for housing Eurostat
Tables by benefits – housing function 
(https:// ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/ web/ 
products- datasets/ product?code=spr_ 
exp_ fho)
– Rent benefits (means- tested) as percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP)
Expenditure as percentage of GDP – HOUSE
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First, results are presented from the logistic regressions run on the 
individual level separately for each country. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
average marginal effect of being unemployed (versus being employed) 
on autonomous living in all EU28 member states in the year 2014. 
The regressions show that in the majority of EU28 countries, being 
unemployed is associated negatively with autonomous living (compared 
to those who are employed). The association is substantial and 
statistically significant for half of the countries considered: in Denmark, 
Estonia, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, and Sweden, unemployed young people are 
between 5 and 10 percentage points less likely than employed people 
to live autonomously. This negative relationship is also observable in 
Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, and Spain, but with a lower gap (less than 
5 percentage points) in the chances of living autonomously between 
the two groups. In contrast, Malta stands out as an outlier, indicating an 
advantage for unemployed people that might, however, be affected by 
the small sample size. The remaining countries show a non- significant 
relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy, with 
extremely low and non- significant coefficients.2 As mentioned in the 
data section, the direct effect of the presence of a partner is associated 
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positively with housing autonomy in line with previous studies. The 
indirect effect of a partner, as a control variable in the relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy, tends to reduce the 
negative association with unemployment, but generally does not reverse 
the direction of the relationship.
Given this overview of the relationship on the individual level (Step 
1), the next step is to test whether some of the country variation can 
be explained by structural and institutional features.
One of the advantages of the two- step approach is that it provides 
a clear visualisation of the multilevel relationship between micro- and 
macrolevel variables in a simple scatterplot. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 plot 
the average marginal effects calculated on the individual level on the 
macrolevel indicators of interest for each hypothesis. The next section 
examines each of the hypotheses in detail.
Hypothesis 1: Employment Protection Legislation
The distributions of the macrolevel variables for the level of employment 
protection do not give a straightforward indication of the direction 
of the relationship with the variable of interest. A clear pattern does 
not emerge from the two panels in Figure 7.2: the negative effect 
Figure 7.2: Indicators of employment protection legislation (EPL) and average 
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of unemployment on housing autonomy is observable not only in a 
country with high employment regulation such as France, but also in 
a country such as Estonia that, on the contrary, is characterised by a 
lower level of regulation.
Yet, some internal trends can be spotted. For example, in countries 
with high EPL (>2.5 points) for regular employment such as France, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, being unemployed is associated 
more negatively with housing autonomy than in other countries with 
less strict regulation. However, there are also countries with a high 
level of EPL regulation (Belgium and Germany) and a non- negative 
association. At the same time, the opposite trend – low regulation/ non- 
negative association – is not observable except in the United Kingdom 
(UK). A quite substantial group of countries with intermediate values 
for EPL (2 to 2.5 points) shows a non- negative association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy (Austria, Finland, Hungary, 
the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).
In the case of temporary contract regulations (right- hand panel of 
Figure 7.2), the distribution takes an inverted Y shape providing a 
non- univocal pattern. Indeed, there are countries with a high negative 
association between unemployment and housing autonomy with 
high levels of EPL and others with relatively low levels for temporary 
contracts (Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden on the one hand, and 
France, Luxemburg, and Lithuania on the other). Testing this type of 
association with a linear regression model in the second step (Table 7.2) 
reveals that the association between the macrolevel variables (both for 
permanent and temporary contracts) is negative but non- statistically 
significant (Models 1 and 5). This indicates that a statistically robust 
moderating effect of EPL for both regular and temporary contracts 
cannot be observed: the level of regulation of employment is not 
statistically associated with a decrease or increase in the (mostly 
negative) association between unemployment and housing autonomy 
occurring on the microlevel. However, as mentioned in the theoretical 
section, the decision to leave the parental home and live independently 
from the family of origin is a complex transition influenced by several 
factors that can also influence the labour market condition itself. As 
an example, the macroeconomic situation on the country level is 
one of the key factors that may play a role in the association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy: a negative macroeconomic 
situation (for example, proxied by a high unemployment rate or 
low GDP growth) may make the situation of unemployed people 
even worse, overruling the level of EPL. Therefore, these two main 
indicators of labour market and economy conditions are added as 
H
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Table 7.2: Second step regression for macrolevel indicators of EPL and the association between unemployment and housing autonomy; linear 
regression coefficients
EPL for regular contracts EPL for temporary contracts No control for partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EPL regular − 0.0326 − 0.0357 − 0.0358 − 0.0389+ − 0.0598**
(0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0225) (0.0270)
EPL temporary − 0.00662 − 0.00646 − 0.00637 − 0.00378 − 0.00774









− 0.000795 − 0.000197
(0.00185) (0.00198)
GDP growth − 0.00757 − 0.00608
(0.00504) (0.00541)
Constant 0.0376 0.0536 0.0534 0.0604 − 0.0288 − 0.0279 − 0.0274 − 0.0293 0.0612 − 0.0685**
(0.0577) (0.0649) (0.0643) (0.0573) (0.0230) (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0228) (0.0669) (0.0286)
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R² 0.084 0.100 0.101 0.180 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.076 0.183 0.019
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on EU- SILC UDB, 2014; OECD data and Eurostat data
new
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control variables (Models 2 to 4 and 6 to 8). The estimates show that 
when controlling for the dynamism of the economy (namely, excluding 
the noise generated by the level of GDP growth), stricter regulation 
for regular contracts negatively moderates the association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy, further worsening the chances 
of housing autonomy for unemployed people. Indeed, estimates in 
Model 4 indicate that one unit increase in EPL for regular contracts 
intensifies the negative effect (as depicted by the average marginal effects 
in Figure 7.2) by almost 4 percentage points, and the relationship is 
significant within 90 per cent confidence intervals.
In addition, a sensitivity check was run without controlling for the 
presence of a partner (Models 9 and 10). The presence of a partner 
is a major predictor of housing autonomy and a confounder in the 
relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy. When 
removing this effect (that is, controlling for the presence of the 
partner), the net association between unemployment and housing 
autonomy decreases.
The models indicate that the (generally) negative association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy is further exacerbated when 
EPL for regular contracts is high (Model 4). When excluding the major 
confounder, the presence of a partner, and also the dynamics of the 
economy, the moderating effect of (stricter) regulation on a regular 
contract remains negative and is statistically significant.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is partly verified, at least for the assumption of a 
negative moderating role of EPL for regular contracts when controlling 
for the dynamics of the economy. Where the labour market is divided 
into protected and non- protected segments (EPL for regular contracts 
is high), it becomes more difficult to find a new job for those who 
are outside, and the disadvantage of unemployed people in terms 
of housing autonomy is further exacerbated. A moderating role of 
EPL for temporary contracts, on the contrary, is slightly negative 
but the relationship is weak (less than 1 percentage point) and never 
statistically significant.
Hypothesis 2: Public expenditure on housing policies
This section repeats the same exercise using macrolevel indicators for 
public expenditure on housing policies. In this case, it is evident that 
no clear association can be observed for any of the three indicators 
(Figure 7.3). Indeed, in most countries, such benefits assume a very 
low level, and most of the dots are skewed to the left side of the graph 
near to zero. This is particularly the case for rent benefits (first panel 
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Figure 7.3: Indicators for expenditure on housing policies (rent benefits, housing 
benefits, housing and social exclusion benefits) and average marginal effect (AME) 
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration on EU- SILC UDB, 2014 and Eurostat data
in Figure 7.3) that are almost equal to zero (as a percentage of GDP) 
for most countries with the only exceptions being the UK, France, 
Denmark, Ireland, Finland, and Germany (and to a lesser extent 
the Netherlands and Sweden). However, for these countries, the 
relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy can also 
assume directly opposing outcomes: in Finland, Germany, and the UK, 
high expenditure in rent benefits (as a percentage of GDP) is associated 
with a neutral effect of unemployment on housing autonomy, whereas 
the association is negative for the other countries. A very similar pattern 
can be observed for housing benefits (second panel in Figure 7.3), with 
the same countries mentioned before in the same position, joined by a 
small group of countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – 
with a slightly negative effect of unemployment on housing autonomy 
(smaller than 5 percentage points). Again, most countries are skewed 
towards zero and no pattern can be identified.
As far as the indicator on expenditure for housing and social exclusion 
is concerned, a clear pattern is not observable. Nonetheless, two groups 
of countries seem to emerge (third panel in Figure 7.3). Indeed, no clear 
correlation can be spotted between level of expenditure and association 
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between unemployment and housing autonomy. However, there is a 
group of countries on the right side of the graph that is characterised 
by relatively high levels of expenditure (greater than 1per cent of GDP). 
However, they show very different outcomes in terms of the effect of 
unemployment on housing autonomy.
There is a second group of countries characterised by a medium 
to low level of expenditure (between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent of 
the GDP) that again show very different outcomes ranging from a 
negative, a null, or even a positive association between unemployment 
and housing autonomy.
However, it has to be considered that there may be a positive 
correlation between higher levels of expenditure for social exclusion 
policies and higher levels of poverty or social vulnerability in the 
country – in other words, the level of expenditure is not really high 
because policies are more developed, but because there is a high number 
of recipients due to diffuse social vulnerability. Such a situation may 
correlate negatively with unemployment, given that, in a situation of 
diffuse poverty and social vulnerability, such compensatory policies 
are not really able to tackle the dimension of housing autonomy, 
but can only satisfy basic needs. Hence, it emerges that the level of 
expenditure cannot play any moderating effect on the relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy.
In this respect, it would be interesting to further investigate the cases 
of Finland and the UK with more detailed qualitative data. These 
countries have a similar null association between unemployment and 
housing autonomy, but relatively high expenditure on rent and housing 
benefits. Moreover, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands also reveal 
a negative microlevel association and relatively high levels of public 
expenditure. For the remaining countries, the level of expenditure is 
extremely low, with the consequence that it cannot be expected to 
make any difference.
Second, as for other types of policies (for example, passive labour 
market policies), strict eligibility criteria may result in there being a 
very restricted number of people who can actually benefit from these 
measures. This may eventually exclude particular categories and result 
in subsidies being of a limited amount. For example, young people 
are generally excluded from social housing projects that tend to assign 
apartments to large families with dependent children, or they may be 
excluded because of fragmented and non- standard working careers that 
do not entitle them to access such benefits. Thus, from a macrolevel 
perspective, it is hard to grasp a possible moderating effect. This is also 
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influenced by the way such policies are designed, often leaving out the 
category of interest: young people.
Indeed, the associations using linear regression models in the second 
step of the multilevel approach (Table 7.3) show that indicators of public 
expenditure on housing policies have a weak moderating effect (about 
1 percentage point – not statistically significant) on labour market 
exclusion and youth housing autonomy.3
Conclusions
Leaving the parental home is a crucial transition in the process of 
becoming an adult. It is also a complex decision involving several 
dimensions on the micro- , meso- , and macrolevels. Individuals make 
their decisions based on economic circumstances, cultural aspects, and 
personal preferences. However, they are also influenced by macrolevel 
factors determined on the institutional level that may make the 
transition smoother (or harder).
Table 7.3: Second step regression for macrolevel indicators of housing policies 










Expenditure on rent benefits 0.0122
(0.0248)
Expenditure on housing benefits 0.0119
(0.0255)




Constant − 0.0451*** − 0.0455*** − 0.0407***
(0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0139)
Observations 28 28 28
R² 0.009 0.008 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1
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This chapter focused on the latter aspect and tested whether and 
to what extent a particular set of macrolevel factors may moderate 
the association occurring on the microlevel between labour market 
(involuntary) exclusion and the housing autonomy of young people 
in Europe.
Economic factors are not the only predictor of housing autonomy. 
In several countries, the presence of a partner, for example, is another 
strong determinant of the probability of living independently from 
the family of origin. Nonetheless, the job situation is important in 
structuring life courses, and the availability of economic resources from 
paid labour is the main source of income particularly for young people, 
providing them with the means to bear the costs of independent living. 
Moreover, this is a domain in which empirical research can provide 
targeted policy suggestions, and in which policies may intervene more 
effectively than in other domains (for example, in the cultural sphere).
Using microlevel data from EU- SILC and macrolevel data 
from OECD and Eurostat, this study tested whether institutional 
configurations such as the level of EPL for regular and for temporary 
contracts, and the level of public expenditure in housing policies, 
may moderate (worsen or loosen) the microlevel association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy. The microlevel association 
tends to be negative in most of the EU28 countries considered, 
indicating that unemployed individuals have lower chances of living 
independently from the family of origin compared to their employed 
peers. Findings from multilevel models indicate that a clear- cut 
moderating effect is not observable for any of the two measures taken 
into consideration. But there are some important differences.
Indeed, as hypothesised, a negative moderating effect is observable 
depending on the level of protection of regular contracts. A high 
level of EPL for regular contracts negatively moderates (worsens the 
mostly negative) association between unemployment and housing 
autonomy, indicating that in segmented labour markets in which 
regular employment is protected and it is harder for unemployed 
young people to get a new job, the negative effect of lack of job on 
the chances of independent living is further exacerbated. However, no 
significant moderating role is observable in this respect for the level of 
protection of temporary contracts. As far as the relationship between 
unemployment and housing autonomy is concerned, different degrees 
of regulation of temporary contracts are not associated with regular 
patterns of decreasing or increasing chances of independent living for 
young unemployed people. This is consistent with the ambiguous role 
of EPL for temporary contracts, as highlighted in the literature, which 
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is also tightly linked to the characteristics of the labour market. Indeed, 
restrictions in the use of temporary employment may on one hand lead 
to upward mobility to permanent jobs in efficient labour markets and 
under favourable economic conditions; on the other hand, however, 
they may lead to downward mobility and unemployment in conditions 
of low job mobility and an economic recession.
Similarly, the analyses show that public policies aimed at supporting 
housing do not significantly moderate the (negative) relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy for young people in 
Europe. Indeed, the level of public expenditure tends to be very low 
in many of the European countries considered. Its distribution divides 
into two main groups: on the one side, countries with very limited 
or even non- existent investment in housing policies; on the other 
side, a small group of countries with relatively generous spending (the 
UK, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden). Both groups however, show heterogeneous outcomes 
when the microlevel association between unemployment and housing 
autonomy is taken into consideration. In this respect, the two- step 
multilevel modelling becomes particularly informative insofar as it gives 
a clear picture of the ongoing trends and points to interesting cases that 
may be investigated further with qualitative data. As an example, further 
investigation of cases such as the UK and France (with relatively high 
expenditure) or Austria and Spain (with relatively low expenditure) but 
opposite outcomes on the microlevel, may provide interesting insights 
into the mechanisms behind the functioning of policies. Indeed, 
findings point to the importance of considering qualitative aspects 
such as the design of the policies, policy mechanisms, eligibility rules, 
and barriers to specific groups if one wants to fully grasp whether 
or not measures put into place to buffer microlevel events achieve 
their potential. Moreover, behind these aggregate data, other critical 
features may be at work such as the role of parental support (Ronald 
and Lennartz, 2018). Indeed, intergenerational support for housing 
(in the form of financial contributions or gifts, exchange, or housing 
inheritance) has emerged as an important alternative to (the lack of 
or underdeveloped) housing policies. Nonetheless, the growing role 
of family resources as a substitute for welfare for younger generations 
raises important issues of intergenerational equity and of widening 
social inequalities among the children of different families.
Notes
 1 Information about the partner represents an endogenous variable in the model 
that may create overcontrol bias because unemployment also affects chances on 
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the marriage/ partner market. Therefore, findings with and without partner are 
compared in the results section.
 2 In this respect, it has to be considered that with cross- sectional data, one cannot 
get rid of a reverse causation problem, because although one is able to observe the 
characteristics of individuals who are already out of parental home, the conditions 
under which these individuals took the decision to exit the parental home are 
not known.
 3 The association remains non- significant after recoding expenditure variables into 
dichotomous variables, as a further check due to the very low levels of expenditure 
that characterise some countries reveals.
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